Constitutional economics: a primer

Table of Contents
Introduction
1. Conceptual Foundations
2. Democracy vs. Autocracy
3. Positive Constitutional Economics
4. Conclusions – and Possible Future Issues
Appendix 1. Coding Countries According to Two Governance Scores
Appendix 2. Empirical Results at a Glance: Constitutional Rules as Explanatory Variables, Cross-Country Results Unless Otherwise Noted

Constitutional political economy has emerged as an indispensable part of political economy. This book offers a concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to this topic. What effects – if any – do constitutions have within autocracies? Can small electoral districts help reduce corruption? Does a country's leadership affect the size of its government? Can direct democratic institutions increase politicians' accountability to citizens? Stefan Voigt, a pioneer in the field, explores these questions and more throughout the course of this cutting-edge primer. As the number of courses in constitutional economics continues to grow, this book fills an important gap in the literature. This highly original project maintains curiosity about the questions it generates, identifying potential new areas of research whilst successfully demonstrating the impact constitutional rules have on political economy.

Accessible to readers without any prior familiarity of the topic
Fills a gap in the literature of political economy by providing an overview of an up-and-coming, increasingly relevant field
Forthcoming about gaps and weaknesses in the field, which will help those searching for their own research topics to easily identify topics to explore