TY  - BOOK
AU  - Fudenberg, Drew
TI  - Game theory
SN  - 9788180520822
U1  - 519.3 
PY  - 2019///
CY  - New Delhi
PB  - ANE Books Pvt. Ltd.
KW  - Game theory
KW  - Mathematical - Economics
N1  - CONTENTS

I Static Games of Complete Information
1 Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
2 Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and Correlated Equilibrium

II Dynamic Games of Complete Information
3 Extensive-Form Games
4 Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
5 Repeated Games

III Static Games of Incomplete Information
6 Bayseian Games and Bayseian Equilibrium
7 Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design

IV Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
8 Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,
Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection
9 Reputation Effects
10 Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information

V Advanced Topics
11 More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction,
and Iterated Weak Dominance
12 Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games
13 Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
14 Common Knowledge and Games
Index
N2  - DESCRIPTION
"Fundenber and Tiroles text will have an immediate and important impact on the way game theory is taught at the graduate level. Not only does it cover most of the central topics in noncooperative game theory, it is as up-to-date and complete as a book in this area could hope to be."
-Charles Wilson, Professor of Economics, New York University

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises.

The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agents optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participants perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics

ER  -