Game theory

Table of Contents
1. The game of chess
2. Utility theory
3. Extensive-form games
4. Strategic-form games
5. Mixed strategies
6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem
7. Equilibrium refinements
8. Correlated equilibria
9. Games with incomplete information and common priors
10. Games with incomplete information: the general model
11. The universal belief space
12. Auctions
13. Repeated games
14. Repeated games with vector payoffs
15. Social choice
16. Bargaining games
17. Coalitional games with transferable utility
18. The core
19. The Shapley value
20. The bargaining set
21. The nucleolus
22. Stable matching
23. Appendices.

DescriptionContentsResourcesCoursesAbout the Authors
Now in its second edition, this popular textbook on game theory is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of technical explanations and the number of worked examples included. Covering non-cooperative and cooperative games, this introduction to game theory includes advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. This edition contains new material on stochastic games, rationalizability, and the continuity of the set of equilibrium points with respect to the data of the game. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a range of disciplines. With numerous exercises, and the addition of a solution manual for instructors with this edition, the book is an extensive guide to game theory for undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences, and will also serve as useful reference for researchers.