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999 |
_c301 _d301 |
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005 | 20190924184733.0 | ||
008 | 190831b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
020 | _a9788120351868 | ||
082 |
_a519.3 _bOSB |
||
100 |
_aOsborne, Martin J. _91259 |
||
245 | _aA course in game theory | ||
260 |
_bPHI Learning Pvt. Ltd. _aNew Delhi _c2016 |
||
300 | _a368 p. | ||
365 |
_aINR _b595.00 |
||
504 | _aPreface. 1. Introduction. I. Strategic Games—2. Nash Equilibrium. 3. Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium. 4. Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions. 5. Knowledge and Equilibrium. II. Extensive Games with Perfect InformatIon—6. Extensive Games with Perfect Information. 7. Bargaining Games. 8. Repeated Games. 9. Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games. 10. Implementation Theory. III Extensive Games with Imperfect Information—11. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information. 12. Sequential Equilibrium. IV Coalitional Games—13. The Core. 14. Stable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the Shapley Value. 15. The Nash Solution. List of Results. References. Index | ||
520 | _aA Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for post-graduate and advanced undergraduate students of Economics, emphasizing the theory’s foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It also includes over 100 exercises. | ||
650 |
_aGame theory _91260 |
||
700 |
_aRubinstein, Ariel _91261 |
||
942 |
_2ddc _cBK |