000			03187nam a22001937a 4500
005			20240206182541.0
008			240206b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780521176040
082			_a519.9 _bHEI
100			_aHeifetz, Aviad _913957
245			_aGame theory: _binteractive strategies in economics and management
260			_bCambridge University Press _aCambridge _c2012
300			_a448 p.
365			_aGBP _b35.99
500			_aTable of Contents Part I. Strategic Interactions as Games: 1. Strategic form games 2. Representing strategic interactions with games Part II. Basic Solution Concepts for Strategic-Form Games: 3. Dominant strategies 4. Strongly dominated strategies 5. Weakly dominated strategies 6. Nash equilibrium Part III. Prominent Classes of Strategic-Form Games: 7. Cooperation and conflict, strategic complements and substitutes 8. Concentrated markets 9. Coordination games and strategic uncertainty Part IV. Uncertainty and Mixed Strategies: 10. Choice under uncertainty and risk dominance 11. Mixed strategies 12. Security strategies, strictly competitive games and the minimax theorem 13. Mixed strategies in general games Part V. Advanced Topics in Strategic Form Games: 14. Rationalizable strategies 15. Stability of equilibria 16. Games and evolution 17. Global games Part VI. Dynamic Games: 18. Extensive form games 19. Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction 20. Commitment 21. Backward induction: limitations and difficulties 22. Moves of nature Part VII. Repeated Games: 23. The repeated prisoner's dilemma 24. Games with unbounded horizon: additional models and results.
520			_aGame theory is concerned with strategic interaction among several decision-makers. In such strategic encounters, all players are aware of the fact that their actions affect the other players. Game theory analyzes how these strategic, interactive considerations may affect the players' decisions and influence the final outcome. This textbook focuses on applications of complete-information games in economics and management, as well as in other fields such as political science, law and biology. It guides students through the fundamentals of game theory by letting examples lead the way to the concepts needed to solve them. It provides opportunities for self-study and self-testing through an extensive pedagogical apparatus of examples, questions and answers. The book also includes more advanced material suitable as a basis for seminar papers or elective topics, including rationalizability, stability of equilibria (with discrete-time dynamics), games and evolution, equilibrium selection and global games. Guides students through the fundamentals of game theory by letting examples lead the way to the concepts needed to solve them Contains applications that have been simplified to make them accessible and attractive for undergraduate students and MBA students taking a one semester course Provides opportunities for self-study and self-testing through an extensive pedagogical apparatus of examples, questions and answers
650			_aGame Theory _912821
942			_cBK _2ddc
999			_c5689 _d5689